Last week, the DHS issued a bulletin to local law enforcement about potential terrorist threats on U.S. utility facilities. I guess it’s a good idea to remind the public that such attacks are within the realm of possibility. But with or without specific, credible intelligence about an imminent attack, given the momentous repercussions of a successful terrorist attack on for example, a nuclear site, isn’t it best to assume the worst? All the time? I don’t see this particularly juicy threat rising and then ebbing, I see it as a constant.
Sharif Mobley was employed between 2002-08 as a maintenance worker at five different nuclear power plants in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland. He moved to Yemen in 2008. In 2010, he was arrested by counter-terrorism agents for alleged ties to Al Qaida and Al Shabab and subsequently killed a guard while trying to escape detention.
His employment at sensitive infrastructure facilities is scary in light of revelations of his ties to Islamic extremism. Absent intelligence about Mr. Mobley from counter terrorism agents and professionals, reading that he was reported to refer to his coworkers as “infidels” is a bad sign. That he remarked to members of his labor union at one of the power plants, “We are brothers in the union, but if a holy war comes, look out” was surely sufficiently suspicious to warrant some kind of intervention, at the time?
When I cut someone off on the 405 freeway and they scream, at me “You jerk!” fair enough. But when out of all possible curses, someone chooses to call me an Infidel – I pay special attention. If one of the terrorist threats we face is from insiders who are attempting to infiltrate positions from which they can attack, then we sure need to pay close attention to the cues around us.
We would be well advised to more closely screen job applicants at sensitive locations by questioning them prior to employment. Screening should not be limited to a criminal background or history but should also include an assessment of future intent based on current affiliations, statements and suspicion indicators in an applicant’s resume, job application and interview. Screening for possible infiltration threat should not end upon acceptance to the workplace, but rather be followed up with periodic assessments. This is true for many work settings but so very important for work environments that offer the kind of threat potential that, for example, a nuclear facility does.
The real irony here is that so many background checks are currently and widely done on employees. However, like USA airport security screens, the process adds hassle and expense for non-threat individuals, distracting our attention from pursuit of the real threats. Results: the threat risk is increased.
I did not read the DHS bulletin but hope it included Potential Methods of Action (PMA) with the most likely way specific utility companies will be targeted by terrorists. Without the PMAs and resulting effective security measures, we run the risk of being paralyzed by threats without action and prevention: a situation loosely analogous to Israel’s use of missile warning sirens. Israel stopped sounding missile sirens if only 1 missile was fired. The missile siren is sounded if more missiles are known to be incoming. Israel legislated the requirements of bomb shelters in public buildings and a safe room in new construction homes as effective and preventative security measures against missile attacks. Define, understand, and act effectively and proactively..