An estimated twelve million tons of cargo is loaded on to passenger carrying aircraft every day, representing one third of all U.S. domestic air cargo. Over ten thousand tons of cargo and mail were shipped domestically in 2009, according to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
Back in 2007, the 9/11 Commission Act began plugging up air cargo security holes by requiring that 50% of all domestic U.S. cargo be screened with a view to total phase in within a few years. Well, a few years is here. August 1, 2010 is the looming deadline for which each piece cargo must be fully screened or it cannot be loaded aboard aircraft.
Securing the air cargo system is a daunting challenge due to the sheer size and quantity of freight being shipped. However, the size and complexity of the cargo system also offers a challenge to a terrorist adversary. Air freight changes many hands from shipper to consignee and is also subject to many route changes and delays. A system that operates with unknowns (delays, change in route, etc.) is less attractive to an adversary who aims to avoid operational contingencies. A terrorist who wants to attack via the cargo route is more likely to infiltrate a freight forwarding company or airline contractor than he is to ship his bomb via mail. Infiltrating the operational environment of the aircraft increases probability for success and mitigates possible mistakes (like sending a bomb as a cargo shipment).
It is therefore the areas around the airport and aircraft that need security strengthening first. Screening all cargo must be done after we make sure that the areas around the aircraft and airport are relatively safe. And while screening cargo is important, an effort must be made to maintain the operational contingencies that make life harder for terrorist adversaries aiming to exploit an otherwise transparent and operationally predictable system.
In an effort to streamline thedaunting effort to screen all cargo, the CCSP (Certified Cargo Screening Program) was put into effect by the TSA. Although airlines are still ultimately responsible for cargo screening, the idea was to shift security responsibility onto specially certified and carefully vetted shippers and freight forwarders. Over 600 such companies have already signed up. The basic idea of the program is that the chain of custody be rigorously tracked. Tamper evident technology is used to assure that screened, secure cargo remains so on its way to the aircraft.
Not surprisingly, there have been some bumps in the road as revealed in the December 2009 GAO (General Accounting Office) audit in which it claimed that the inspection process was focusing on quantity rather than outcomes and, that “air cargo is vulnerable to the introduction of explosives and other destructive items before it is loaded onto planes, potentially creating risks for the traveling public.” Suggestions were made for mitigation of access control vulnerabilities, improvement the security assessment process and provision of more guidance for the security training and testing requirements.
A lack of focus on outcomes strikes me as key and frankly, endemic to U.S. security across the board. There has to be an overriding, clearly defined security mission understood by each and every individual working together to ensure the success of that mission. If everyone isn’t on board, it just won’t work.
